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Implied Private Rights of Action: Definition, and 
Factors to Determine Whether a Private Action Will 
Be Implied from a Federal Statute 
Caroline Bermeo Newcombe* 
When the heirs of singer Ray Charles wanted to terminate a copyright, 
they had something in common with a student who wanted to obtain 
damages from her school after a teacher assaulted her. Both the heirs 
and the student asked a court to judicially imply a private right of action 
from a federal statute. This Article will provide insight into the subject of 
implied private rights of action. It will define what a private right of 
action is, discuss where private actions came from, and then provide 
sixteen guidelines to predict whether a court will imply a private action 
from a federal statute. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the heirs of singer Ray Charles wanted to terminate a copyright, 
they had something in common with a student who wanted to obtain 
damages from her school after a teacher assaulted her. Both the heirs and 
the student asked a court to judicially imply a private right of action from 
a federal statute. The aim of this Article is to provide insight into the 
subject of implied private rights of action and to suggest guidelines to 
determine whether a private action will be implied from a federal statute. 
Implied private rights of action appear in areas as diverse as copyright 
law,1 education law,2 civil rights law,3 and securities law.4 The 
 
1. Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson, 795 F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A]n implied private 
cause of action exists under the termination provisions [of the Copyright Act].”). 
2. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992) (recognizing implied right 
of action to allow a student to recover damages against her school under Title IX); see also Jackson 
v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005) (recognizing implied private right of action 
for retaliation under Title IX). 
3. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969) (finding private right of action 
implied under the Voting Rights Act). 
4. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 37 (2011) (“We have implied a 
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importance of these actions cannot be overestimated.5 Indeed, afraid that 
a court might imply a private action from a statute that does not contain 
one, the drafters of the Communications Act expressly prohibited the 
implication of any private action at all.6 
This Article will begin by defining what a private right of action is in 
Part I. Part II will briefly discuss the origin of implied private rights of 
action. Because statutes are the most important source of implied private 
action today, Part III will provide guidelines to determine whether a 
private right of action will be implied from a federal statute. 
I.  DEFINITION OF AN IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION 
A private right of action allows a private plaintiff to bring an action 
based directly on a public statute, the Constitution, or federal common 
law. Although Congress has placed express private rights of action into 
legislation such as the Clayton Antitrust Act7 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,8 implied private rights of action are not created by 
Congress. They are created by courts. A judicially created implied private 
right of action allows a private plaintiff to enforce a public statute, despite 
the fact that the statute itself contains no express right of action.9 For 
example, courts have recognized a private party’s right to bring an action 
for violation of certain provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, even 
though “Congress made no specific reference to a private right of 
action. . . .”10 Why is this important? It is important because in instances 
 
private cause of action from the text and purpose of §10(b) [of the Securities Exchange Act].”). 
5. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963, 965 (1994) (implied private rights of action have been 
used to obtain billions of dollars from claims based on securities fraud) (emphasis added). 
6. Communications and Video Accessibility Act, 47 U.S.C. § 613(j) (2010) (“Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to authorize any private right of action to enforce any requirement of this 
section or any regulation hereunder. The [Federal Communications] Commission shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to any complaint under this section.”). 
7. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) (“Any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
8. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (a)(1) (“The remedies and procedures 
set forth in [the Act] are . . . provid[ed] to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on 
the basis of disability in violation of [this Act].”) (emphasis added). 
9. A district court explained the difference between an “express” and an “implied” private 
action:  
Many federal statutes provide a private cause of action through their express terms. Other 
federal statutes, however, merely define rights and duties, and are silent on the issue of 
whether an individual may bring suit to enforce them. For statutes in this latter 
category . . . courts have held that “implied” private rights of action may exist subject to 
statutory interpretation. 
Landegger v. Cohen, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1284 (D. Colo. 2013). 
10. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964), abrogated on other grounds by Ziglar 
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where no express private right of action exists in a statute, a private 
plaintiff seeking to enforce such a statute has an alternative source of 
relief: a judicially implied private right of action. Justice Powell 
compared express versus implied rights of action in the following 
manner: “[W]e are not dealing here with any private right created by the 
express language of [a federal statute] . . . We are dealing with a private 
cause of action which has been judicially found to exist. . . .”11 
The examples above demonstrate that, although Congress envisioned 
that it would be a public agency like the Securities Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) that would unilaterally enforce certain statutes, this is not what 
happened. Federal courts, through the judicial creation of implied private 
rights of action, have allowed individual plaintiffs to bring private claims 
under various public statutes that do not expressly provide for such 
actions.12 
Moving from examples and turning to the technical definition of a 
private right of action, these actions are defined as the “right of a private 
party to seek judicial relief from injuries caused by another’s violation of 
a legal requirement.”13 Normally this “legal requirement” is based on a 
statute passed by Congress. However, implied private actions can also be 
based on the United States Constitution, federal regulations, or federal 
common law.14 
Having discussed what an implied private right of action is, it is 
important to note what it is not. Cases involving the existence of an 
implied right of action are distinct from cases involving standing.15 
Standing focuses on the nature of the plaintiff’s injury.16 In contrast, 
cases involving the existence of an implied cause of action focus on the 
right the plaintiff is claiming.17 Put another way, standing involves “who” 
 
v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
11. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748–49 (1975) (emphasis added). 
12. The question of whether to create a private right of action has been described by the Supreme 
Court in the following way: “Since the [federal statute] does not explicitly create a private 
enforcement mechanism, the initial question presented . . . is whether such a private right of action 
can be implied on behalf of those allegedly injured by a claimed violation of [the statute].” 
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 289–90 (1981). 
13. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 730 n.1 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
14. See infra notes 24–28. 
15. See La. Landmarks Soc., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 85 F.3d 1119, 1122 n.3 (5th Cir. 
1996). 
16. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (noting that there are three 
elements necessary to establish “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”). 
17. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (distinguishing between a plaintiff’s 
right and a plaintiff’s relief). Most federal courts are aware of the distinction, and caution that before 
addressing any standing issue, “a court must answer the threshold question of whether a statute 
affords a plaintiff a private right of action.” Asbury Park Bd. of Educ. v. Hope Acad. Charter Sch., 
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may assert a cause of action, while implied private right of action cases 
involve the entirely different question of whether the cause of action itself 
exists.18 
In addition to standing, there is another area that presents a source of 
confusion for anyone entering the world of implied private right of action 
analysis. This is the area of private attorneys general.19 Plaintiffs who 
become private attorneys general usually do so to advance the public 
interest.20 Plaintiffs proceeding under an implied private right of action 
generally do so to advance their own interest.21 If a private right of action 
plaintiff recovers damages against a defendant, the plaintiff keeps the 
money. If a private attorney general plaintiff obtains a penalty from a 
defendant, the fine usually goes to the government.22 
II.  SOURCES OF IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS 
Implied private rights of action can be separated into two categories: 
theoretical sources and subject matter sources. Subject matter sources are 
those broad areas of law such as education law, securities law, or civil 
rights law from which implied private rights of action can arise. 
Theoretical sources, on the other hand, provide the foundation for the 
implication of private rights of action in all areas of law. 
A.  Theoretical Sources 
This Article takes the position that there are four theoretical sources of 
federal implied private rights of action. These sources are: (a) the United 
 
278 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 n.2 (D.N.J. 2003). 
18. In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC, 721 F.3d 54, 68 (2d Cir. 2013) (“However, the 
question of who may assert a right of action is presented ordinarily only if a right of action has been 
found to exist.”) (emphasis added). 
19. The term seems to have made its first appearance in 1943, when a federal judge noted that 
“even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest[,] [these] persons, so authorized, are, so 
to speak, private Attorney Generals.” Associated Indus. of N.Y. State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 
(2d Cir. 1943), vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). 
20. Justice Harlan described the interests of private attorneys general as “bereft of any personal 
or propriety coloration . . . hav[ing] standing as ‘representatives of the public interest.’” Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119–20 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
21. See id. at 119 n.5. Private actions contain “almost no mention of vindicating the public’s 
rights . . . or other similar expressions of serving the common good. . . . ” Pamela H. Bucy, Private 
Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002). 
22. See Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 580 F. Supp. 862, 863 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Because there 
is no private right of action for damages under the F.W.P.C.A. [Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act], any fines levied would be payable to the Government and not to the plaintiff.”) (emphasis 
added). Another difference is that, unlike implied private right of action plaintiffs, a plaintiff 
proceeding as a private attorney general can, in some cases, recover attorneys’ fees on the ground 
that they are “vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.” Fox v. Vice, 
563 U.S. 826, 833 (2011). 
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States Constitution;23 (b) “limited” federal common law;24 (c) federal 
regulations;25 and (d) federal statutes.26 
Statutes are the most common source of implied private rights of 
actions in federal courts.27 Because of their importance as the primary 
source of implied private rights of action today, the remainder of this 
Article will provide guidelines to determine whether a private action will 
be implied from a federal statute. These guidelines can be better 
understood after a brief discussion of the development of implied private 
actions themselves. 
B.  Development of Implied Private Rights of Action 
The doctrine of implied private rights of action, so heavily dependent 
 
23. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (holding there is a 
federal remedy for an unlawful search and arrest not limited to conduct condemned by state law). 
“Bivens authorizes a private cause of action against federal officials . . . who violate an individual’s 
constitutional rights while acting under color of federal law.” Mullen v. Bureau of Prisons, 843 F. 
Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2012). 
24. The need to provide a uniform rule to resolve interstate controversies is an example of a 
limited federal common law area which can provide the basis for an implied private right of action. 
See, e.g., Drucker v. O’Brien Moving & Storage, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 616 (D. Nev. 1990), aff’d on 
other grounds, 963 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff was allowed to bring an implied private 
right of action, based on federal common law, in a case arising from an interstate move involving 
a common carrier. The district court specifically found that “it is important that the rules [involving 
the interstate movement of goods by a common carrier] be uniform throughout the United 
States. . . .” Id. at 623. 
25. Implied private rights of action can be based on federal regulations designed to implement 
a federal statute. For example, Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951)) is a regulation designed 
to implement section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act. Private actions brought under Rule 10b-
5 have become “the most litigated segment of securities law.” ALFRED F. CONARD, ET AL., 
ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION: CASES, STATUTES, AND ANALYSIS ON EMPLOYMENT, AGENCY, 
PARTNERSHIPS, ASSOCIATIONS, AND CORPORATIONS 935 (4th ed. 1987). 
26. Of course, state statutes can provide the basis for state implied private rights of action. E.g., 
Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 630 P.2d 840, 848 (Or. 1981) (holding the state statute did not 
give rise to a claim for relief in private actions). However, as its title suggests, this Article is about 
federal statutes. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss state implied private rights of action. 
27. Grundfest, supra note 5, at 963. (“Most private securities fraud litigation arises pursuant to 
statutory provisions . . . provisions for which the courts have implied private damage remedies that 
are not express in the statute.”) (emphasis added). One of the reasons statutes are the primary source 
of implied private rights of action is because courts have refused to extend private actions based on 
the Constitution (so-called Bivens actions) into new contexts. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 
1843, 1855 (2017). In addition, actions based on “limited common law” are rare. They are limited 
to unique situations such as the need for uniformity in a case involving an interstate move, an 
interstate bill of lading, and an interstate common carrier. See, e.g., Drucker, 745 F. Supp. at 623. 
Finally, implied private actions based on federal regulations are themselves a type of statutory-
based private right of action. This is because the Supreme Court has declared that a private action 
cannot be based on a federal regulation which creates an entirely new prohibition different from 
the statute it was purporting to enforce. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001) 
(“Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through statutory 
text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not.”). 
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on statutes today, originated as a principle of the common law having 
nothing to do with statutes. 
It rested on the English common law principle that for every legal right 
there is a remedy.28 This meant that if a legal right already existed, then 
a court had the power to fashion a remedy. This common law principle 
was used by John Marshall to decide Marbury v. Madison.29 It was only 
after the explosion of legislation in the early twentieth century30 that 
statutes began to emerge as a foundation for implied private rights of 
action. 
Implied actions based on statutes have gone through several 
identifiable eras of development. Each era either restricted or expanded 
the availability of implied private rights of action. The first era was 
transitional. It began with a 1916 case based on a common law claim of 
negligence and a federal statute. In Texas & Pacific Railroad v. Rigsby,31 
the common law provided an injured railroad employee with a cause of 
action against his employer for negligence,32 while a federal statute 
provided a duty of care.33 
The transitional era was followed by an expansive era. This was a time 
when private rights of action were “freely inferred” from federal 
statutes.34 The height of the expansive era occurred in the 1960s when 
the Supreme Court decided J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.35 In that case, the 
 
28. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1783). 
29. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). In that case, the Secretary of State refused to deliver a judicial 
commission to William Marbury. Justice Marshall found that Marbury had a legal right to his 
commission. Id. at 162. Relying on William Blackstone’s famous treatise on the common law, 
Marshall declared, “it is a general and indisputable rule that where there is a legal right, there is 
also a legal remedy. . . .” Id. at 163 (citing BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 23). 
30. In a case decided in 1994, the Supreme Court wrote, “In this century, legislation has come 
to supply the dominant means of legal ordering. . . .” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S 244, 
272 (1994). 
31. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). 
32. In a petition filed by the railroad employee plaintiff in the Fifth Circuit on Oct. 9, 1913, 
Count II states that “the said defendant was negligent in not having the said hold or grab securely 
fastened to the said car, and that by reason of such negligence, the same gave way and threw the 
plaintiff to the ground.” (on file with author). 
33. The worker was injured after he fell off a box car because of a defective hand hold. The 
Federal Safety Appliance Act provided that railroad cars shall “be equipped with secure hand 
holds. . . .” Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 37. The fact that the statute was enacted for the benefit of a particular 
class was legally significant because it triggered “a common-law tradition” which “regarded the 
denial of a remedy as the exception rather than the rule.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374–75 (1982). 
34. Long Term Care Pharmacy All. v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2004). 
35. 377 U.S. 426 (1964), abrogated by Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). The 1960s was 
popularly known as the Civil Rights era. About this expansive era, Justice Rehnquist wrote, 
“Congress, at least during the period of the enactment of the several Titles of the Civil Rights Act 
tended to rely to a large extent on the courts to decide whether there should be a private right of 
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Court announced that courts had the ability, indeed even the duty, to 
create new implied private rights of action, and that these actions could 
be based on the broad ground of legislative purpose.36 This was an 
extraordinary decision because of the breadth of judicial lawmaking 
power that the Supreme Court appeared to sanction.37 
After its opinion in Borak, the Supreme Court’s acceptance of implied 
private rights of action became more grudging. The judicial stage was 
now set for the more restrictive approach of Cort v. Ash.38 In Cort, the 
Supreme Court developed a four-factor test to determine whether a 
private action could be implied from a federal statute.39 
This four-factor test underwent significant reconstruction at the hands 
of the Supreme Court in 1979, and the factor of legislative intent emerged 
as the “central inquiry.”40 Although they were weakened—and seemed 
to be only a shadow of their formerly lively selves—Cort’s other factors 
survived, along with additional factors, which the remainder of this 
Article will discuss.41 
III.  FACTORS USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER A PRIVATE ACTION WILL 
BE IMPLIED FROM A FEDERAL STATUTE 
Other than Cort’s weakened four factors, no precise test has been 
articulated to determine whether a federal court will imply a private 
action from a federal statute. Nevertheless, the following factors have 
consistently emerged as guidelines for the creation of implied private 
rights of action. In reviewing these factors, it is important to note that not 
all factors are weighed equally. The “legislative intent” factor, along with 
the “rights creating” factor, are the most significant. The following 
factors are presented chronologically, not in order of their significance. 
 
action, rather than determining this question for itself.” Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 718 
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (italics in original) (underlining added). 
36. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433 (“[I]t is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as 
are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.”) (emphasis added). 
37. About Borak, one district court remarked that, “the Borak approach is viewed as the least 
restrictive approach in determining whether a private cause of action may be discerned from a 
statute.” Landegger v. Cohen, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1284–85 (D. Colo. 2013) (emphasis in original). 
38. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
39. These factors are: (1) whether the plaintiff is part of a class “for whose special benefit the 
statute was enacted[;]” (2) whether there is an indication of any legislative intent to deny or create 
such a remedy; (3) whether the remedy would be consistent with the “underlying purposes” of the 
legislation; and (4) whether the subject of the cause of action was one “traditionally relegated to 
state law” so that it would be inappropriate to imply a new action based on federal law. Id. at 78. 
40. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979). 
41. Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Cases subsequent to Cort 
have recognized that all four factors may be important, but the determinative question is whether 
Congress intended to create a private right of action in favor of the plaintiff.”). 
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We begin with the type of statute that the plaintiff has chosen to rely on. 
A.  FACTOR ONE: Type of Statute 
1.  Prohibitory Statutes Favored; Disclosure and Recordkeeping Statutes 
Not Favored 
A court is more likely to base an implied private right of action on a 
prohibitory statute, rather than a disclosure statute. Title IX is a 
prohibitory statute which the Supreme Court has held “implies a private 
right of action to enforce its prohibition on intentional sex 
discrimination.”42 The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)43 is a 
disclosure statute. When a plaintiff tried to use FOIA as the basis for an 
implied private right of action, the Supreme Court refused, emphasizing 
that FOIA is “exclusively a disclosure statute.”44 Recordkeeping statutes 
are also disfavored. This is because recordkeeping statutes, like 
disclosure statutes, do not contain standards of conduct which a private 
action could enforce.45 For example, a statute which simply imposed a 
recordkeeping requirement on a business could not provide the basis for 
an implied private action because it proscribed “no conduct as 
unlawful.”46 
2.  Spending Clause Statutes Disfavored 
A court is also less likely to imply a private right of action from a 
spending clause statute. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(“FERPA”) is a spending clause statute.47 In 2002, after first noting that 
recent decisions “have rejected attempts to infer enforceable rights from 
Spending Clause statutes,”48 the Supreme Court refused to allow a 
plaintiff to use FERPA to bring a claim under an implied right of action 
theory.49 
The reluctance of a court to make an implied action available under a 
Spending Clause statute is based, in part, on the contractual nature of this 
 
42. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005) (citing Cannon v. Univ. of 
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690–93 (1979)). 
43. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
44. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979). 
45. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 424 (1975). 
46. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979). 
47. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278 (2002) (“Congress enacted FERPA under its 
spending power to condition the receipt of federal funds on certain requirements relating to the 
access and disclosure of student educational records.”). 
48. Id. at 281. 
49. Id. at 286. 
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type of legislation.50 Acceptance of the terms of a contract cannot be 
knowing51 if one party to the contract is unaware of new conditions that 
might be imposed on it through the judicial creation of an implied private 
action. 
The contractual nature of spending clause legislation also has practical 
implications for implied private right of action plaintiffs. This is because 
it can limit the type of relief a plaintiff can obtain.52 For example, when 
a plaintiff asked the Supreme Court to imply a remedy for punitive 
damages from a spending clause statute, the Court refused.53 It did so 
because punitive damages are “not normally available” in a contract 
action.54 Finally, it is important to note that simply because a statute is 
characterized as a spending statute is not by itself determinative of 
whether a court will imply a private action.55 
3.  Jurisdictional Statutes Cannot Provide the Basis for an Implied 
Private Right of Action 
At one time, the Supreme Court appeared to suggest that a private right 
of action could be implied from a jurisdictional provision.56 This is not 
the law today. The Court has flatly rejected the idea that a jurisdictional 
provision, standing alone, can provide the basis for an implied private 
right of action.57 Instead, the source of a plaintiff’s action must be found 
“in the substantive provisions” of the statute the plaintiff is trying to 
 
50. Spending Clause legislation is “in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the 
States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); see also Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
1378, 1387 (2015) (echoing Pennhurst in analyzing Medicaid funds). 
51. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the 
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 
‘contract.’”). 
52. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (“Although we have been careful not to 
imply that all contract-law rules apply to Spending Clause legislation, . . . we have regularly 
applied the contract-law analogy in cases defining the scope of conduct for which funding 
recipients may be held liable for money damages.”) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); but 
see David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spending Power, 52 S.D. L. REV. 496, 
497 (2007) (“[A]cceptance or rejection of this [contract] thesis . . . has split the Justices into two 
essentially equal camps. . . .”). 
53. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 189. 
54. Id. at 188. 
55. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1994) (Title IX is a spending clause statute). 
56. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (Section 27 of the Securities Exchange 
Act grants district courts jurisdiction “of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce 
any liability or duty created by this title.”). 
57. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979) (plaintiff’s source of 
remedy must be found in the substantive provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, not the 
jurisdictional provisions). 
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enforce.58 The reason that jurisdictional provisions cannot provide the 
basis for an implied private action is because they create no cause of 
action and impose no liability.59 
4.  Civil Statutes Preferable to Criminal Statutes 
Not only will courts refuse to imply a private right of action from a 
jurisdictional statute, courts are also reluctant, but not always opposed, 
to imply a private right of action from a criminal statute.60 There are two 
reasons for this. First, criminal statutes are designed to benefit the public 
at large and not a particular class.61 Second, they do not ordinarily “confer 
a right to a person.”62 
B.  FACTOR TWO: Statute Must Identify a Particular Group it is 
Designed to Benefit; Criminal Statutes and General Regulatory Statutes 
Often Fail to Satisfy This Requirement 
Criminal statutes are not favored as sources of implied private actions 
because they fail to satisfy a requirement of implied private rights of 
action analysis. This is the requirement that a statute must expressly 
identify a specific group that the statute is designed to benefit.63 
General regulatory statutes also fail to satisfy this requirement. In fact, 
the Court has “come to view the implication of private remedies in 
regulatory statutes with increasing disfavor.”64 This is because regulatory 
statutes, like criminal statutes, are usually enacted for the general public; 
they are not enacted for the benefit of a specific class. For example, in 
refusing to engraft a private right of action onto the Rivers and Harbors 
Act, the Supreme Court found that the language in the statute was not 
 
58. See id. 
59. See AT&T v. M/V Cape Fear, 967 F.2d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1992) (provision controlling 
jurisdiction, venue, or service of process creates no private cause of action). 
60. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (“We 
have been quite reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition alone. . . .”); 
see also Concert v. Luzerne Cty. Children & Youth Servs., No. 3:CV-08-1340, 2008 WL 4753709, 
at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2008) (“Criminal statutes do not generally provide a private cause of action 
nor basis for civil liability.”). 
61. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979). 
62. See Jones v. Lockett, No. 08-16, 2009 WL 2232812, at *8 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 2009) (“It is 
clear that the criminal statutes invoked by Plaintiff . . . do not provide for a private cause of action. 
In other words, those statutes do not confer a right to a person.”). 
63. For example, after two ships broke one of AT&T’s underwater cables, AT&T tried to bring 
an implied private right of action against the vessels based on the Submarine Cable Act. The Third 
Circuit refused. AT&T, 967 F.2d at 867. It characterized the Cable Act as “primarily criminal in 
nature,” making it a misdemeanor to break an underwater cable. It contains no more than a general 
proscription and does not “focus on any particular class of beneficiaries. . . .” Id. (citation omitted). 
64. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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intended to benefit a particular class.65 Instead, “it was intended to benefit 
the public at large through a general regulatory scheme. . . .”66 Similarly, 
in denying a private right of action to an airline passenger under the Air 
Deregulation Act (“ADA”), a federal court based its decision on the fact 
that “ADA provisions do not expressly identify domestic air passengers 
as a class that Congress intended to benefit.”67 
C.  FACTOR THREE: The Statute Relied on Must Confer a “Right” on 
the Plaintiff 
In addition to benefiting a particular class, for a statute to provide the 
basis of an implied private right of action the statute must create “a federal 
right in favor of the plaintiff.”68 So important is this “rights-creating” 
factor that if a court determines at the outset that the statute at issue 
confers no substantive right, then it will not go on to the question of 
whether there is an implied private cause of action.69 
Courts have looked at the following characteristics to determine 
whether a statute creates the necessary federal right to support an implied 
private right of action: (a) whether the statute contains individual rights; 
(b) whether the focus of the statute is on the individual protected, not the 
entity regulated; and (c) whether the right is definite and specific. Each 
characteristic will be discussed below. 
1.  Statute Must Create an Individual Right 
The first characteristic a court will look at is whether the statute 
contains any rights at all. If a statute provides “no indication that 
Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis 
for . . . an implied right of action.”70 
For example, when a plaintiff tried to bring an implied private right of 
action under the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Eleventh 
Circuit began its opinion by announcing, “We begin by looking to the 
text of [the statute] for rights-creating language.”71 The court noted that, 
while a statute that includes words like “no person shall be denied the 
right to vote” does contain the necessary rights-creating language,72 the 
 
65. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297–98 (1980). 
66. Id. at 297–98 (emphasis added). 
67. Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517, 522 n.8 (5th Cir. 2002). 
68. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see also Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 1378, 1387 (2015) (“Section 30(A) [of the Medicaid Act] lacks the sort of rights-creating 
language needed to imply a private right of action.”) (emphasis added). 
69. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 n.21 (1981). 
70. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286 (2002). 
71. Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d 1278, 1296 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). 
72. Id. at 1296–97 (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 555–57 (1969)). 
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Gaming Act contains no rights-creating language. Therefore, the statute 
cannot be used to provide the basis for an implied private right of action.73 
The same rights-creating factor was emphasized by the Supreme Court in 
Alexander v. Sandoval.74 The Sandoval case involved an attempt to bring 
a private cause of action based on a regulation to enforce a section of Title 
VI.75 The Court refused to imply a private action because it was “clear 
that the ‘rights creating’ language so critical” to the creation of an implied 
private action was absent from the section.76 
A federal court reached the opposite conclusion in Indiana Protection 
and Advocacy Services v. Indiana Family and Social Services 
Administration.77 In that case, the Seventh Circuit decided that the 
Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act 
(“PAIMI Act”) could be enforced by an implied private action. Unlike 
the statute in Sandoval, the statutory language in the PAIMI Act directly 
granted rights to the “plaintiff here.”78 
2.  The Focus of the Statute Must Be on the Individuals Protected, Not 
on the Entity Regulated 
A second characteristic a court will look at to determine whether the 
statutory language is sufficient to provide the necessary individual “right” 
is whether the focus of the statute is on the entity regulated, rather than 
the person protected. For example, in denying a private right of action to 
a worker under the Davis-Bacon Act,79 the Supreme Court found that, 
although the Act required that provisions be put into federal construction 
contracts to benefit “laborers,” the requirement did “not confer rights 
directly on those individuals.”80 Similarly, a federal court refused to 
imply a private action under the Indian Open Dump Cleanup Act because 
the statute simply created “agency obligations.”81 The statute did not 
“focus on the rights of protected parties.”82 
 
73. See id. at 1297. 
74. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
75. See id. at 278 (“[This] case presents the question whether private individuals may sue to 
enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”). 
76. Id. at 288. 
77. 603 F.3d 365, 383 (7th Cir. 2010). 
78. Id. at 378 (“Unlike the statute[] in Sandoval . . . the PAIMI Act’s key language is not 
directed at an administrator . . . Instead, the Act directly grants rights and powers to the . . . plaintiff 
here.”). 
79. Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3141 (2006) et seq.  
80. Univs. Research Ass’n, Inc. v. Corfu, 450 U.S. 754, 772 (1981). 
81. El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, 750 F.3d 863, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing 25 
U.S.C. § 3901 et seq.). 
82. Id. (finding “no right of action can be implied in the [Indian Open Dump Cleanup Act]”). 
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In short, if a federal statute merely imposes a duty on an entity or an 
agency, but fails to create any rights in favor of the plaintiff, then a court 
will ordinarily refuse to imply a private right of action. Indeed, one 
federal court concluded that “the right- or duty-creating language of the 
statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of 
implication of a cause of action.”83 
3.  The Right Must Be Definite and Specific 
A third characteristic a court will look at to determine whether the 
statute at issue contains the necessary “right” is whether the so-called 
right is definite and specific. 
Only unambiguously conferred rights can provide the basis for an 
implied cause of action.84 Statutory language which consists of vague 
words like “decent, safe, and sanitary” is not sufficiently definite.85 Such 
language suggests that “Congress did not intend to create a judicially 
enforceable right.”86 
As the discussion above indicates, there is no easy solution to the 
problem of deciding whether a statute creates the necessary “right” to 
support an implied private action. Before leaving this section, it is 
important to note that, in looking for cases to support the existence of a 
federal right, the same cases used to determine the existence of a federal 
right for purposes of establishing a statutory “right” under 42 U.S.C. § 
198387 can also be used to support the existence of a statutory “right” for 
purposes of creating an implied private right of action.88 
 
83. La. Landmarks Soc., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 85 F.3d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir. 1996). 
Earlier, the same court found that the statute at issue “‘creates no rights in favor of individuals’ but 
rather, it ‘imposes duties on a federal agency. . . .’” Id. (citing Abate v. S. Pac. Trans. Co., 928 F.2d 
167, 169 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
84. Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (“We now reject the notion that our cases permit 
anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under 
§1983 . . . we further reject the notion that our implied right of action cases are separate and distinct 
from our §1983 cases.”). 
85. See Banks v. Dall. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the Supreme 
Court finds “statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create 
no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
86. Id. 
87. More than a hundred years after 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted, the Supreme Court expanded 
the scope of protections afforded under § 1983 to include violations of federal statutory law, as well 
as constitutional law. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). However, the Court also ruled that 
for a statutory claim to go forward, the plaintiff in a § 1983 action must assert the defendant’s 
violation of “a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 
329, 340 (1997) (emphasis in original). 
88. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 (“[O]ur implied right of action cases should guide the 
determination of whether a statute confers rights enforceable under § 1983.”). The Court went on 
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D.  FACTOR FOUR: The Conduct of the Defendant Must Be Intentional 
Turning from statutory language to potential defendants, liability for a 
private right of action will be imposed only if the action of a defendant is 
intentional. Mere negligence is not enough to support an implied private 
right of action. For example, intent is a necessary element of any implied 
private action brought under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.89 
Intent is also an element of the private action created by the Court under 
Title IX to prohibit discrimination in education.90 Liability can only 
attach if a school intentionally acts in violation of Title IX.91 Liability 
cannot be imposed against any school vicariously, or through 
imputation.92 
E.  FACTOR FIVE: “Remediless” 
A court will be more likely to create an implied private action in a case 
where a plaintiff lacks any remedy at all. To deny a plaintiff an implied 
private action in such a situation would leave such a plaintiff 
“remediless.” The remediless factor can appear in two contexts. 
1.  Remediless Factor Arising from Agency Failure to Enforce an 
Existing Statutory Remedy 
The first context arises in a situation where a remedy exists, but the 
government agency tasked with enforcing a statute refuses to do so. 
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools93 provides an example of the 
Supreme Court deciding to imply a private remedy from a federal statute 
after the public agency tasked with enforcing it failed to do so. The 
Franklin case arose when a 14-year-old female student was repeatedly 
and brazenly94 sexually assaulted by a teacher/coach. The Court allowed 
the student to seek damages, based on an implied private right of action 
 
to declare that: “[T]he initial inquiry—determining whether a statute confers any right at all [under 
§1983]—is no different from the initial inquiry in an implied private right of action case. . . .” Id. 
at 285 (emphasis added). 
89. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (“§10(b) [of the Securities Exchange 
Act] . . . cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone.”). 
90. See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999) (finding an intentional 
violation of Title IX does not bar a private cause of action); see also Hunter ex. rel. Hunter v. 
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 456 F. Supp. 2d 255, 265 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2006) (“deliberate indifference” 
standard is met when school system intentionally violates Title IX). 
91. Hunter, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 265. 
92. Davis, 526 U.S. at 642. 
93. 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992). 
94. Id. at 63 (three times the coach “interrupted a class, requested that the teacher excuse [the 
student] and took her to a private office where he subjected her to coercive intercourse.”). 
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theory, since any other approach would have left her “remediless.”95 
The student was indeed remediless. Although she complained to her 
school’s administrators, not only did the school fail to take substantive 
action, one school official attempted to dissuade her from pursuing any 
complaint at all!96 Of even more significance was the fact that the Office 
of Civil Rights of the Department of Education, the federal agency 
charged with enforcing Title IX’s gender discrimination ban, closed its 
investigation once the teacher resigned.97 Remarkably, the agency 
decided to close its investigation even though the agency itself had 
reached the conclusion that the student’s rights had been violated.98 
2.  Remediless Factor Arising from the Fact That a Statute Contains No 
Remedy at All 
The second context in which the remediless factor can arise is in a 
situation where a statute contains no remedy at all.99 A court is more 
likely to imply a private action under a rights-creating statute that 
contains no enforcement mechanism. For example, when shareholders of 
a bank asked a court to imply a private right of action under the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act, the federal court agreed.100 The court examined 
the statutory scheme and found that there was no means to enforce its 
provisions “apart from an implied private right of action.”101 The court 
went on to hold that where Congress failed to provide an enforcement 
mechanism, “it is appropriate to infer that Congress did not intend to 
enact unenforceable requirements. Thus, it is fair to imply a private right 
of action from the statute at issue.”102 
Similarly, in an earlier case involving a statute which prohibited unions 
 
95. Id. at 76 (emphasis added). 
96. Id. at 64. The lower court opinion tells the story. Franklin v. Gwinnett City. Pub. Sch., 911 
F.2d 617, 618 (11th Cir. 1990) (After the student reported the teacher to school authorities, another 
teacher “tried to discourage her from pursuing the matter by talking to her about the negative 
publicity. . . . [The second teacher also contacted the student’s boyfriend] in an effort to enlist his 
assistance to discourage Franklin from pursuing the matter.”), rev’d, 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
97. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 64 n.3. 
98. Id. (Although the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education, (OCR) “concluded 
that the school district had violated the student’s rights by subjecting her to physical and verbal 
sexual harassment and by interfering with her right to complain . . . [OCR] terminated its 
investigation.”). 
99. Wisniewski v. Rodale, Inc., 510 F.3d 294, 297 (3rd Cir. 2007) (Some federal statutes 
“merely define rights and duties, and are silent about whether an individual may bring suit to 
enforce them. For some statutes in this latter category, courts have held that ‘implied’ private rights 
of action exist.”). 
100. See First Pac. Bancorp, Inc. v. Helfer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000). 
101. Id. at 1126. 
102. Id. 
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from discriminating against minority workers, the Supreme Court 
“judicially implied” a remedy.103 The Court declared that where statutory 
duties are in the form of commands, and there is an “absence of any 
available administrative remedy,” the only mode of enforcement is the 
courts.104 
F.  FACTOR SIX: Type of Remedy Sought 
A federal court is more likely to imply a private action if the plaintiff 
is seeking equitable relief, rather than money damages. For example, in 
deciding to imply a private right of action for accounting in favor of a 
bank’s shareholders, the Ninth Circuit pointed to the fact that the remedy 
plaintiff shareholders were seeking was “an equitable one, an 
accounting.”105 The court went on to declare that “because the remedy at 
hand is an equitable one, we are more inclined to perceive in Congress’ 
silence a presumption that an individual may pursue a claim.”106 
G.  FACTOR SEVEN: Federalism: Whether the Claim Involves an Area 
That is Normally Relegated to State Law 
A court is less likely to create a private right of action from a federal 
statute if the subject matter is one traditionally regulated by state law.107 
Family law is a traditional area of state law. In Thompson v. 
Thompson,108 the Supreme Court refused to recognize an implied private 
right of action involving a custody dispute under the federal Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act.109 The Court declared that allowing a parent 
to bring an implied private right of action under the Kidnapping Act 
would entangle federal courts in an area of “traditional state-law 
 
103. Steele v. Louisville Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944). The Supreme Court later 
determined, “The right to bring unfair representation actions is judicially ‘implied from the statute 
and the policy which it has adopted’ . . . and Congress has not specified what remedies are available 
in these suits.” Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979) (citing Steele, 323 U.S. 
at 204). 
104. Steele, 323 U.S. at 207. 
105. First Pac. Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1125. 
106. Id.; see also Note, Private Rights of Action—Equitable Remedies to Enforce the Medicaid 
Act—Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 129 HARV. L. REV. 211, 215–16 (2015) (“As its 
private-rights-of-action doctrine has evolved, the Court has drawn distinctions among different 
remedies. . . . In suits for damages under federal statutes . . . the Court has applied a skeptical 
approach. . . . Yet in suits for equitable relief, the approach has remained broad and 
permissive. . . .”). 
107. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (If a cause of action is “traditionally relegated to state 
law, . . . then it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law.”). 
108. 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988) (analyzing a possible private right of action under 28 U.S.C. § 
1738A). 
109. Id. (There is a “conclusive case against inferring a cause of action in federal court to 
determine which of two conflicting state custody decrees is valid.”) (emphasis added). 
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questions” which they “have little expertise to resolve.”110 
Landlord-tenant law is another traditional area of state law. When a 
plaintiff tried to bring an implied private right of action based on a 
housing statute, a federal court refused on the ground that states have a 
great interest in the area of landlord-tenant law.111 
H.  FACTOR EIGHT: Interference with Statutory Purpose 
A court is less likely to recognize a new private action if it would 
interfere with the purpose of a statute. For example, in National Railroad 
Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers,112 the 
Court refused to imply a private right of action in favor of a railroad 
passenger who wanted to challenge a route reduction plan under the Rail 
Passenger Service Act.113 The Court found that the purpose of the statute 
was to eliminate uneconomic train routes. Permitting passengers to bring 
private rights of action would hurt the overall statutory purpose.114 
Similarly, when a cable operator sought to imply a private right of action 
that would have allowed him to prevent another cable operator from 
providing service, a federal court refused.115 The court explained that the 
purpose of the Act was “to promote competition,” and allowing an 
incumbent cable operator to bring a private action against a new entrant 
might thwart competition.116 
I.  FACTOR NINE: Accomplishment of Statutory Purpose 
The factor of statutory purpose is a double-edged sword. In addition to 
being used to deny an implied private right of action, “purpose” can also 
be used as a factor in support of the creation of an implied private right 
of action. For example, when bank shareholders asked a federal court to 
imply a private right of action under the Federal Reserve Act, the court 
noted that an important inquiry in deciding the case was whether 
implying a new remedy “is consistent with the underlying purposes of the 
legislative scheme.”117 
 
110. Id. at 186. 
111. See Jefferies v. District of Columbia, 917 F. Supp. 2d 10, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting an 
inconsistency with any federal legislative scheme “to imply a private cause of action where the 
legal right invoked is one traditionally left to state law. It would be hard to find an area of law in 
which states have a greater interest . . . than in the legal area of landlord-tenant.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
112. 414 U.S. 453, 465 (1974). 
113. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501–02 (repealed 1994). 
114. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 463 (1974). 
115. San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2010). 
116. Id. at 31. 
117. First Pac. Bancorp, Inc. v. Helfer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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However, it is important to note that statutory purpose alone cannot be 
used to create an implied private right of action. The Court abandoned 
the “legislative purpose” theory as the sole basis for implied private right 
of action analysis some time ago in favor of a theory based on legislative 
intent.118 
J.  FACTOR TEN: Requirement of Legislative Intent: Enforcement 
Provisions Already Contained in a Statute as an Indicator of Legislative 
Intent 
No matter how strong a case can be made that an implied private right 
of action will further a statutory purpose, a court will not imply a private 
right of action from a federal statute unless it can be demonstrated that 
Congress intended to create a private right of action.119 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has declared legislative intent to be the central inquiry.120 
Unfortunately, no precise test has been developed to determine legislative 
intent. What there is instead are indicators of legislative intent. A primary 
indicator of legislative intent has already been discussed. This is whether 
the statute contains rights-creating language.121 In addition to rights-
creating language, enforcement provisions already present in a statute can 
also provide an indication of legislative intent. 
Examples of enforcement provisions which can provide an indication 
of legislative intent are: (a) whether the statute provides an express 
private right of action in one section, but not in another; (b) whether the 
statute at issue already provides a comprehensive and detailed 
enforcement mechanism; and (c) whether the statute at issue delegates 
enforcement to a federal agency. Each of these “enforcement” indicators 
will be discussed below. 
1.  Indication of Legislative Intent: Express Private Right of Action 
Already Contained in Other Parts of the Statute at Issue 
One indication of legislative intent is whether the statute that Congress 
 
118. Lest there be any doubt about the viability of statutory purpose as the sole basis for an 
implied private right of action today, the Court has characterized statutory purpose analysis as 
something we “abandoned” forty years ago. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001); see 
also Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J., 283 F.3d 429, 434 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing statutory 
purpose, in the context of implied private right of action analysis, as something belonging to an 
“ancien regime”). 
119. See Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Congressional 
intent is the keystone as to whether a federal private right of action exists for a federal statute.”). 
120. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991) (“[R]ecognition of any 
private right of action for violating a federal statute must ultimately rest on congressional intent to 
provide a private remedy.”) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979)). 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 68–86. 
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enacted already contains an express private means of enforcement.122 
This would appear to indicate that Congress did not intend to leave open 
the possibility of the implied addition of another private remedy.123 For 
example, when the Ninth Circuit refused to imply a private right of action 
under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it noted that Congress had 
already expressly created a private right of action under Section 306 of 
the same Act.124 The court went on to declare that, “we cannot find in 
Congress’ silence in section 304 an intent to create a private right of 
action where it was not silent in creating such a right . . . in other sections 
of the same Act.”125 
Similarly, when a cable operator asked a federal court to imply a 
private right of action under section 541(b)(1) of the Cable 
Communications Policy Act, the court refused.126 The court found it 
“particularly noteworthy” that Congress provided a private right of action 
in an adjacent provision of the same statute.127 
2.  Indication of Legislative Intent: Statute Already Contains a Detailed 
Enforcement Mechanism That Expressly Prescribes Other Remedies 
The presence of an elaborate enforcement mechanism in a statute also 
tends to contradict any legislative intent to create additional private 
remedies. For example, in a case involving the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act128 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act,129 the Supreme 
Court announced that, in view of the “elaborate enforcement provisions” 
each statute contained, “it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to 
authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for private 
citizens. . . .”130 
In short, if a statute already contains a comprehensive enforcement 
scheme, then this becomes a factor in discerning legislative intent.131 
 
122. Winding Creek Solar LLC v. Peevey, No. 13-cv-04934-JD, 2015 WL 675388, at *6 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 17, 2015) (“[T]he existence of [] express remedies demonstrates . . . that Congress 
intended to foreclose implied private actions. . . .”) (alteration in original). 
123. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 121 (2005). 
124. In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2008). 
125. Id. at 1233. 
126. San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2010). 
127. Id. at 30. 
128. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–75 (2012). 
129. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401–45 (2012). 
130. See Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981); 
see also Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981) (“The presumption 
that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a 
comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.”). 
131. See Wisniewski v. Rodale, Inc., 510 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2007) (exploring possible 
boundaries for determining congressional intent). 
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Similarly, if a statute “expressly prescribes other remedies,” then this also 
“belies congressional intent to create an implied right of action. . . .”132 
3.  Indication of Legislative Intent: Statute Delegates Enforcement to a 
Federal Agency 
Another indicator of legislative intent is whether a statute has 
delegated enforcement to a federal agency. In Acara v. Banks,133 a court 
held that the Affordable Care Act could not provide patients with an 
implied private right of action to remedy improper disclosure of their 
medical records because the Act delegated enforcement to the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”).134 The court found 
the specific delegation to HHS to be a “strong indication that Congress 
intended to preclude private enforcement.”135 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that delegating enforcement to a 
federal agency is not conclusive of a congressional intent to preclude 
private actions. For example, as the beginning of this Article noted, 
although the SEC is the agency charged with enforcing various securities 
laws, implied private actions have been allowed to play a significant role 
alongside the agency’s own enforcement actions.136 
K.  FACTOR ELEVEN: Presumption Against the Creation of an Implied 
Private Right of Action 
The reason that legislative intent must be established as the foundation 
for an implied private right of action is not only because of the obvious 
separation of powers issue (courts are not supposed to “usurp” Congress’ 
power to legislate),137 but also because of the presumption against the 
 
132. Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d 1278, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015). 
133. 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2006). 
134. Id. at 571 (“The express provision of one method of enforcing [a statute] suggests that 
Congress intended to preclude others.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 
532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001)). 
135. Id. It should be noted that an indication that Congress intended to preclude private 
enforcement becomes particularly strong when a statute delegates enforcement to a federal agency 
with expertise in a complex area. Such a complex area is rate setting for reimbursement to providers 
of Medicaid services. In Armstrong, which involved an attempt by providers to bring a private 
enforcement action “to enjoin unlawful executive action,” the Supreme Court refused private 
enforcement of the relevant statute. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 
1385 (2015). The Court found that “[t]he sheer complexity associated with enforcing § 
30(A) . . . shows that the Medicaid Act precludes private enforcement of § 30(A) in the courts.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
136. See supra note 12. 
137. See In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In 
the absence of clear evidence of congressional intent, we may not usurp the legislative power by 
unilaterally creating a cause of action.”). 
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creation of new private actions. 138 
A plaintiff seeking to imply a private action today has the burden of 
proof to overcome the presumption against the judicial creation of new 
implied actions.139 The old presumption in favor of the implication of 
new private actions has been discarded.140 A new “presumption against 
implying private rights comes into play” today.141 Unless a plaintiff can 
offer evidence of congressional intent, the presumption will not be 
overcome. 142 
L.  FACTOR TWELVE: Congressional Silence, or Acquiescence, 
Cannot Be Used as a Substitute for Legislative Intent 
1.  Silence 
The Supreme Court has declared that where a statute is “silent on the 
question of a private remedy, ‘implying a private right of action on the 
basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best.’”143 
Other courts have observed that legislative silence is not enough. Instead, 
a plaintiff seeking to have a court imply a private action must provide 
evidence of legislative intent. For example, one court noted that 
“legislative silence is often encountered in implied right of action 
cases . . . [b]ut unless this congressional intent can be inferred from the 
language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the 
essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not 
exist.”144 
2.  The Acquiescence Doctrine 
Similarly, congressional acquiescence cannot provide the basis for an 
 
138. See San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The baseline 
rule is that a federal statute ordinarily should be read as written, in effect creating a presumption 
against importing, by implication, a private right of action. This de facto presumption has 
considerable bite; it ‘can be overcome only by compelling evidence of a contrary congressional 
intent.’”) (quoting Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 68 (1st Cir. 2002)). 
139. See, e.g., Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[P]laintiff has the relatively 
heavy burden to show Congress intended private enforcement, and must overcome the presumption 
that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action.”). 
140. Long Term Care Pharmacy All. v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Private 
rights of action were once freely inferred from federal statutes . . . but the ready inference in favor 
of private enforcement no longer applies.”). 
141. United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 2001). 
142. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017) (“[W]hen deciding whether to recognize 
an implied cause of action, the ‘determinative’ question is one of statutory intent.”). 
143. Till v. Unifirst Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 653 F.2d 152, 160 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979)). 
144. Baker v. Montgomery Cty., 50 A.3d 1112, 1125 (Md. 2012) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981)). 
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implied private right of action either. For example, in Central Bank of 
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,145 plaintiffs argued that, since 
Congress had failed to amend certain securities laws to provide that a 
cause of action for aiding and abetting was not available, then Congress 
had acquiesced to a judicially implied private cause of action recognized 
by some lower federal courts. The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act146 could not provide the basis for 
an implied private right of action for aiding and abetting.147 In making its 
ruling, the Court declared: “[O]ur observations on the acquiescence 
doctrine indicate its limitations as an expression of congressional 
intent. . . . ‘Congress may legislate, moreover, only through the passage 
of a bill . . . Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted 
statute.’”148 
M.  FACTOR THIRTEEN: Agency Position in Favor of Implication 
Another factor, although a minor one, is whether the federal agency 
charged with enforcing the statute at issue is in favor of implication. For 
example, when the Court decided to imply a private right of action under 
Title IX, it noted that the department which administered the statute had 
taken the position that a private cause of action should be implied.149 It 
is important to note that courts do not always give weight to an agency’s 
position. Courts are supposed to decide cases based on legislative intent, 
not what the agency charged with enforcing a statute thinks. For example, 
although the SEC filed an amicus brief in support of a plaintiff who 
sought to establish an implied private action for aiding and abetting,150 
the Supreme Court refused to imply a private right of action.151 
N.  FACTOR FOURTEEN: Cause of Action or Remedy 
Courts are more reluctant to imply a brand new cause of action than to 
imply a remedy for a cause of action that already exists. For this reason, 
 
145. 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994). 
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
147. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191 (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit 
aiding and abetting, we hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit 
under § 10(b).”). 
148. Id. at 186 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175, n.1 (1989)) 
(emphasis added), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1074. 
149. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 686, 687 (1979). 
150. Brief for the Securities Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 5, Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) 
(No. 92-854), 1993 WL 13006275, at *5. 
151. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191. 
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a plaintiff seeking to have a court imply a remedy should say so. For 
example, when a plaintiff asked the Third Circuit to imply a private action 
for contribution, the court began by declaring that, “we must determine 
if a right of contribution is a right of action in itself or whether it is a 
remedy.”152 In that particular case, the plaintiff strenuously argued that 
he was merely seeking a remedy.153 The court observed that by 
characterizing an action for contribution as a remedy, the plaintiff was 
trying to avail himself of “the principle that once a right and cause of 
action are established, the federal courts are empowered broadly to award 
any appropriate relief.”154 
O.  FACTOR FIFTEEN: Public Defendant as a Factor 
Whether the defendant is a government entity is another factor that 
determines if a court will imply a private action. Implying a cause of 
action against a government entity is dramatically different from seeking 
to imply an action against a private defendant.155 This is because the 
immunities available to a government entity, as well as the restricted 
remedies available against a government entity, differ significantly from 
those available to and against a private party. 
1.  The United States Enjoys Immunity from Suit Under the Doctrine of 
Sovereign Immunity 
As a general rule, “the United States enjoys immunity from suit.”156 
The origin of this immunity is the doctrine of sovereign immunity.157 
What this means, as a practical matter, is that unless a plaintiff can 
produce a statutory waiver of immunity, any action naming the United 
States as a defendant will fail.158 This is because the United States cannot 
 
152. Bowers v. NCAA, 346 F.3d 402, 419 (3d Cir. 2003). 
153. Id. (“Temple argues that the right of contribution is a remedy.”). 
154. Id. at 420. Characterization of whether a plaintiff is seeking a new right of action, or a 
remedy, will not necessarily determine the outcome. See id. (“[T]his case should not turn on our 
characterization of the nature of contribution as the Supreme Court has not determined whether 
contribution is available by clearly distinguishing among rights, rights of action, and remedies.”). 
155. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 291 n.8 (2011) (“[R]emedies against the government 
differ from ‘general remedies principles’ applicable to private litigants.”). 
156. Roman-Cancel v. United States, 613 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2010). 
157. Muirhead v. Mecham, 427 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2005) (“It is beyond cavil that, as the 
sovereign, the United States is immune from suit without its consent.”) (emphasis added). Gregory 
C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and Money Claims 
against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 606 (2003) (“The concept of ‘sovereign 
immunity’—that is, the immunity of the federal government from suit without its express 
permission . . . underlies and permeates the subject of litigation against the federal government.”). 
158. In deciding whether a statutory waiver exists, three factors should be taken into account. 
First, there is a “general rule that ‘a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly 
construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.’” Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 
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be sued without consent from Congress.159 Native American tribes within 
the United States also enjoy sovereign immunity, and this can provide a 
defense to an implied private right of action. For example, in Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez,160 the Supreme Court refused to imply a private right 
of action under the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) because 
“suits against the tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign 
immunity from suit.”161 
2.  The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity Applies to Federal Agencies 
and to Federal Officials Acting in Their Official Capacities 
Just as the United States cannot be sued, federal agencies and federal 
officers acting in their official capacities cannot be sued either.162 This is 
why the implied private right of action plaintiff in the famous Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics163 case did not 
name the Federal Bureau of Narcotics or the drug enforcement officers in 
their official capacities as defendants. It is because “an action against a 
federal agency or federal officers in their official capacities is essentially 
a suit against the United States[.]”164 For a potential plaintiff, this means 
that many public defendants are immune from suit.165 
3.  The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity Does Not Apply to Federal 
Officials Sued in Their Personal Capacities 
As indicated above, federal employees acting in their official 
 
481, 491 (2006) (citation omitted). Second, jurisdictional statutes, standing alone, “do not operate 
as waivers of sovereign immunity.” Munaco v. United States, 522 F.3d 651, 653 n.3 (6th Cir. 2008). 
Third, a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied. Sossamon, 563 U.S. at 288 (citation 
omitted). 
159. Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Block v. North Dakota 
ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983)); see also Williamson v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting the United States is immune from suit except 
when it consents). 
160. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
161. Id. at 59. 
162. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191–92 (1996) (“equalization provision” of Rehabilitation 
Act Amendments of 1986 does not indicate congressional intent to subject federal agencies to 
liability for money damages); see also Griggs v. LaHood, 770 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011) (“[T]he federal government, and by extension, federal employees acting in their official 
capacities, are entitled to absolute sovereign immunity from suit.”). 
163. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The case held “the Fourth Amendment implies a private right of 
action against government officials engaged in illegal searches.” See also John P. Cronan, 
Comment Subjecting the Fourth Amendment to Intermediate Scrutiny: The Reasonableness of 
Media Ride-Alongs, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 949, 951 n.16 (1999) (citing Bivens for the same 
proposition). 
164. Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis 
added). 
165. Griggs, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 551–52. 
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capacities enjoy sovereign immunity from suit. However, if a federal 
employee is sued in his or her individual capacity, “sovereign immunity 
does not apply.”166 This is why the federal agents in Bivens were only 
named as defendants in their individual capacities.167 
4.  If the Defendant is a State, a Plaintiff Must Also Confront Sovereign 
Immunity 
Just as the United States enjoys sovereign immunity, each of the fifty 
states also enjoy immunity from suit. A state enjoys two different species 
of immunity. First is the Eleventh Amendment,168 which presents a bar 
to an action against a state by a private individual in federal court.169 
In addition to Eleventh Amendment immunity, states also enjoy “a 
broader sovereign immunity, which applies against all private suits, 
whether in state or federal court.”170 What this means for a private right 
of action plaintiff is that, if the defendant is a state, the first issue the  
plaintiff must face is whether the state has waived its sovereign 
immunity.171 If it has not, then any implied private right of action case is 
at an end. For example, in Sossamon v. Texas,172 a prisoner tried to bring 
an implied private action against the State of Texas under the federal 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The Supreme 
Court refused, holding that a private cause of action “does not include 
suits for damages against a State.”173 
 
 
166. Id. at 552. 
167. In Bivens, the plaintiff sued the federal agents in their individual capacities as six unknown 
agents. 403 U.S. at 391. “Bivens authorizes a private cause of action against federal officials in 
their individual capacity who violate an individual’s constitutional rights while acting under color 
of federal law.” Mullen v. Bureau of Prisons, 843 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing 
Simpkins v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added). 
168. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit . . . commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State. . . . ”). 
169. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (noting a state’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity can be abrogated by Congress in situations involving enforcement 
of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (stating 
that the Eleventh Amendment is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
170. Beaulieu v. Vermont, 807 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 713, 722 (1999) (discussing state sovereign immunity generally, including that beyond the 
Eleventh Amendment). 
171. Turner v. Boyle, 116 F. Supp. 3d 58, 73 (D. Conn. 2015) (“A suit generally may not be 
maintained directly against the State itself, or against any agency or department of the State, unless 
the State has waived its sovereign immunity.”) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of State v. Treasure Salvors, 
Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 684 (1982)). 
172. 563 U.S. 277 (2011). 
173. Id. at 288. 
 
144 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  49 
5.  A State Agency, Which is an “Arm of the State,” Cannot Be Sued, 
Nor Can the Agency’s Employees Acting in Their Official Capacities 
Just as states cannot ordinarily be sued, most state agencies cannot be 
sued either. Specifically, the Eleventh Amendment protects state 
administrative agencies, which are “arms of the state,” from being sued. 
For example, the Nevada State Bar Association is immune from suit 
under the Eleventh Amendment because it was found to be an “arm of 
the state.”174 Immunity also extends to state agency employees “acting in 
their official capacities as agents of the state.”175 
6.  State Employees Sued in Their Individual Capacities May Be 
Entitled to “Qualified” Immunity 
Potential implied private right of action plaintiffs should be aware that 
it makes a difference whether a state employee is sued in an official 
capacity or in an individual capacity. While the Eleventh Amendment 
provides a form of absolute immunity to state employees sued in their 
official capacities, a state employee sued in his or her individual capacity 
is only entitled to qualified immunity.176 Qualified immunity protects 
public employees from liability for conduct the employee could not have 
reasonably known would violate a “clearly established” constitutional or 
statutory right.177 The purpose of qualified immunity is to give 
“government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 
judgments. . . .”178 
P.  FACTOR SIXTEEN: Subject Matter as a Factor 
In addition to the identity of the defendant, another factor courts look 
to is subject matter. The hospitality of a court toward the creation of a 
 
174. Mirch v. Beesely, 316 F. App’x 643, 643 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. 
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) (affirming dismissal of an action against the South 
Carolina States Port Authority (“SCSPA”) on sovereign immunity grounds after finding that the 
SCSPA was an “arm of the State of South Carolina”). It is important to note that the determination 
of whether a state agency is an “arm of the state” is a matter of federal law, not state law. Pub. Sch. 
Ret. Sys. of Mo. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 640 F.3d 821, 827 (8th Cir. 2011). 
175. Mirch, 316 F. App’x at 643 (citing Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
176. Walker v. Bd. Trs. Reg’l Trans. Dist., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (D. Colo. 1999) (qualified 
immunity is “only available to those defendants sued in their personal capacities”). 
177. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity 
protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.’”) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also Plumhoff v. 
Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014) (“An official . . . is entitled to qualified immunity unless it 
is shown that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was ‘clearly established’ at 
the time of the challenged conduct.”). 
178. City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015). 
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new implied private right of action seems to depend, in part, on subject 
matter. Specifically, courts appear to be more hospitable to claims based 
on civil rights,179 as opposed to bare claims involving property or 
economic loss.180 This is not unusual if one considers the fact that, in 
some procedural due process cases involving “mere” property rights, the 
Court is willing to postpone a constitutionally required hearing in cases 
where “only property rights are involved.”181 A hint of this preference is 
already visible in the power of Congress to abrogate a state’s sovereign 
immunity if a claim arises from a Fourteenth Amendment civil rights 
violation.182 The same understandable preference exists in Congress’ 
decision to award attorneys’ fees to certain plaintiffs who bring civil 
rights actions because they are “vindicating a policy that Congress 
considered of the highest priority.”183 
No case holds that courts should be more sympathetic to a plaintiff 
who brings an implied action to enforce a civil right, rather than an 
economic right. However, a 2005 Supreme Court case, Jackson v. 
Birmingham Board of Education,184 is instructive. Although the case was 
decided during the modern era, which burdens a plaintiff with a 
 
179. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969) (finding private right 
of action implied under the Voting Rights Act of 1965), abrogated on other grounds by Ziglar v. 
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969) 
(finding private right of action implied under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 for discrimination in the sale of real 
property), abrogated by Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 
315 (4th Cir. 2003) (“It is well-settled that there is an implied private right of action to enforce § 
601’s [of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] core prohibition of discrimination. . . . ”). 
180. With this in mind, it does not seem to be coincidental that the most expansive era of implied 
private rights activity coincided with the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s. Indeed, 
Justice Rehnquist commented on the expanded role of courts in deciding whether to imply private 
actions during the Civil Rights Era: “Congress, at least during the period of the enactment of the 
several Titles of the Civil Rights Act[,] tended to rely to a large extent on the courts to decide 
whether there should be a private right of action, rather than determining this question for itself.” 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (italics in original). 
Similarly, Cass Sunstein calls this the period of the “rights revolution of the 1960’s and 1970’s.” 
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 409 (1989) 
(referring to the increased number of statutes designed to protect, e.g., the environment, consumers, 
and “victims of discrimination”). 
181. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520 (1944) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
This is not to suggest that the Court will always postpone a due process hearing involving property 
rights. As the famous case of Goldberg v. Kelly held, it is unconstitutional to deny welfare recipients 
a pre-termination due process hearing when the property right at stake involved “the very means 
by which to live.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). 
182. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (explaining that Congress can 
abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity “for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment [and to] provide for private suits against States[.]”) (emphasis added). 
183. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 833 (2011) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 
U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam)). 
184. 544 U.S. 167 (2005). 
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presumption against the creation of new implied private actions, the 
Court nevertheless used Title IX to imply a private action for retaliation 
in favor of a plaintiff who was not himself the victim of gender 
discrimination.185 Title IX is a civil rights statute designed to enforce the 
Equal Protection Clause by prohibiting educational institutions from 
discriminating on the basis of gender.186 The origin of the new implied 
private action in Jackson began when a male high school coach 
complained that his school discriminated against members of the female 
basketball team he coached.187 He successfully went on to claim that he 
was entitled to bring an implied private right of action under Title IX 
because the school “retaliated” against him after he complained.188 
The case was unusual, not just from a factual point of view (the 
plaintiff himself was not the victim of discrimination), but also from a 
statutory interpretation point of view. This is because, although other civil 
rights statutes contain specific prohibitions against retaliation,189 Title IX 
does not. Nevertheless, the Court held that the plaintiff could bring an 
implied private right of action for retaliation under Title IX, despite the 
fact that the word “retaliation” does not appear anywhere in the statute.190 
Four members of the Court dissented.191 They claimed that the Court 
established “a prophylactic enforcement mechanism designed to 
encourage whistle-blowing about sex discrimination.”192 The dissent 
concluded that, by creating its own enforcement mechanism “out of 
 
185. The Court held: 
Nor is the Court convinced by the Board’s argument that . . . Jackson is not entitled to 
invoke it [Title IX] because he is an ‘indirect victi[m]’ of sex discrimination. . . . The 
statute is broadly worded; it does not require that the victim of the retaliation must also 
be the victim of the discrimination that is the subject of the original complaint. 
Id. at 179. 
186. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . .” absent statutory 
provisional exceptions.). 
187. Jackson v Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. at 171 (“Jackson began complaining to his 
supervisors about the unequal treatment of the girls’ basketball team, but to no avail.”). 
188. Id. at 183 (“Title IX . . . supplied sufficient notice to the Board that it could not retaliate 
against Jackson after he complained of discrimination against the girls’ basketball team.”). 
189. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
190. Specifically, the Court held “Title IX’s private right of action encompasses suits for 
retaliation, because retaliation falls within the statute’s prohibition of intentional discrimination on 
the basis of sex.” Jackson, 544 U.S. at 178. About the fact that the word “retaliation” does not 
appear anywhere in the statute, the dissent argued: “Congress enacted a separate provision in Title 
VII to address retaliation . . . Congress’ failure to include similar text in Title IX shows that it did 
not authorize private retaliation actions.” Id. at 189 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
191. Id. at 184. The dissent was written by Justice Thomas, and joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. 
192. Id. at 185. 
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whole cloth,” what the Court did was to “substitute[] its policy judgments 
for the bargains struck by Congress, as reflected in the statute’s text.”193 
Some commentators have questioned whether the Court in Jackson 
“overstated its boundaries in finding that Title IX created a private right 
of action for retaliation in the absence of a clear Congressional intent to 
do so.”194 
Finally, while courts may be understandably hospitable to implied 
private claims when the subject matter involves civil rights, they are 
reluctant to entertain claims when the subject matter involves foreign 
affairs. For example, when an informer sought to have a federal court 
imply a private action under the Neutrality Act,195 a federal court refused. 
Before dismissing the claim, it declared that “courts ‘must be especially 
certain . . . before inferring a private cause of action’ in the realm of 
foreign affairs.”196 
CONCLUSION 
The shortcomings of the current approach to implied private rights of 
action, anchored on vague notions of legislative intent, have created a 
situation of unpredictability and confusion. As a result, implied private 
rights of action can be viewed from two extremes. On one hand, is the 
picture painted by some courts that believe a private right of action is the 
only recourse that remediless plaintiffs, like the 14-year-old student in 
Gwinnett, have against officials who refuse to enforce a federal law, or to 
enforce a statute that contains a legal right, but does not contain an 
express remedy to enforce that right. On the other hand, is the critical 
view of implied private rights of action painted by the dissent in Jackson. 
Under this view, the judicial creation of implied private actions allows a 
court to disregard policies adopted by Congress and substitute its own 
policy judgments. The practical result of this effort is to allow a private 
plaintiff to create not just a remedy for an already existing legal right, but 
instead, as the Court did in Jackson, to create the legal right itself. 
Depending on the circumstances of each particular case, it appears that 
elements of both extremes may be correct. 
 
193. Id. at 195 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
194. Charles J. Russo & William E. Thro, The Meaning of Sex: Jackson v. Birmingham School 
Board and Its Potential Implications, 198 W. EDUC. L. REP. 777, 778 (Aug. 11, 2005). 
195. Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. § 962. The case involved an attempt by a plaintiff to obtain 
money, under an implied private right of action theory, for informing the U.S. government about 
vessels that had violated an Israeli naval blockade. Bauer v. Marmara, 942 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 
2013), aff’d, 774 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
196. Bauer, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 42. Specifically, the court held that the Neutrality Act “lacks an 
express private cause of action, and the court declines the plaintiff’s invitation to imply one.” Id. at 
43. 
